Hundred twenty-fourth edition of the N&O column / Spooks newsletter

(Date: December 2007)

Voice stations | Morse stations | Various modes
Military stations | Utility round-up
Knickebein, X-Gerät, Y-Gerät
N&O 2007 index | Logs
Index | NS NL Home


Military stations

Russian, CIS, Ukrainian military SSB & CW stations (including M32)

Again a very long report. I start with comments submitted by Fritz:

"As expected, the deployment of 11 ships of the Northern - and the Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic early December did not influence the Morse traffic of the CIS Ny. It was business as usual with stations asking for phone patches, online encrypted - or MS-5 traffic.

Apart from the HQ in Severomorsk RIT, in Sevastopol RCV, Kaliningrad RMP, Vladivostok RJS and Moscow RIW the following stations were engaged in December:

Collective Callsigns : RKZ, REO, RBGJ, RJV, RJU57.
Individual Callsigs : RJE56, RMDZ, RBIZ, RJD23, RAL48, RJI63, RMXV, RHY73, RGL93, RKB91, RIE83, RMZW, RMW33, RGZ58, RCRE, RHL80, RCJG, RJT22, RIS96, RJD69, RGV82, RAA (this is a mystery as it used RIW's exclusive QRG 11000 kHz for a message to RMDZ).

The VGK (General Staff) network on 18.1 kHz transmitted at selected times in parallel on 7657, 6342, 14411, 5438, 9044, 8508, 8696, 11468 and 4582 kHz. During the European Daytime up to 5 Strategic Flash Messages could be received. Most of them made RCV on 10201 kHz sending another Flash Message to RJV within 5 minutes. RJV was assumed to be the Strategic Bomber Airfield Tiksi, but in this context RJV rather could be Tartous (SYR).

Examples:

12-12-2007
1353z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RKS RKS RDL RDL 06695 29376 twistor 5586 0345 k
1355z 10201 kHz : xxx xxx RJV RJV 38620 ojskopiä 0075 8089 k
1430z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RKS RKS RDL RDL 98937 51046 priöuxh 2445 ... (QRM) k
1431z 10201 kHz : xxx xxx RJV RJV 96094 akobo 3168 8963 k
 
17-12-2007
0930z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RKS RKS RDL RDL 61882 15924 provilina 5467 4890 k
0935z 10201 kHz : xxx xxx RJV RJV 84087 sgorowentoe 1939 2444 k
0945z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RKS RKS RDL RDL 87967 67742 papskij 1174 0988 k
0949z 10201 kHz : xxx xxx RJV RJV 89943 skolox 9576 3028 k
1023z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RKS RKS RDL RDL 33658 57665 gipologiä 7814 3311 k
1026z 14411 kHz : xxx xxx RDL RDL 70183 90705 barsuöij 7264 8234 k
1028z 10201 kHz : xxx xxx RJV RJV 03365 storov 6952 4889 k

Naval Air Transport was heard on 8816 kHz at Dec. 18th:
Aircraft 09418 to RCB and RJF94: QTR 1015 QRD XMKK XUMO QRE 1415 QBD 1700 k
RCB and RJF94 acknowledge."

Thanks for the extended report, Fritz. Next are the logs. Most of them were copied by Trond, Alf, Tom, Jim and Peter. Great job, all.

18.1 Russian High Command Moscow, Vileyka Radio centre.
  // 7657, 8130, 9346, 11468, 12741, 13490, 14411
20.5 RJH66: 338th communications node Kara Balta, Chaldovar Radio centre, Kyrgysztan. N0N standard frequency transmission (12/dec/2007)
2736.5 Russian Air Force: REA4
2843.5 Russian Mil.
3207.0 CIS Mil: 5J3T
3217.0 Russian Mil. F2BB sends msg to PRO9: "F2BB 722 23 5 0104 722 = ZLB 642 = TSPHP PPPPP DVHDR ... UCAIB PTPäO 974 K". PRO9 QSLs on freq 3393 kHz.
3354.0 Russian Mil. L9MN comms check with 3SLO, LZ2A and S8AP. All respond on QSX freq 2839 kHz.
3366.0 Russian Mil: DE 7S1Q QTC K"
3863.0 CIS Mil. VLDK wkg A4CU
4027.0 Russian Navy: "rif35 rif35 de rjv38 rjv38 qsa 2 qsa ? k"
  "rjv38 rjv38 de rif35 rif 35 qsa ? k"
4055.0 Russian Navy: RCV. 5FGs "07032" "rjp54 de rcv"
4397.0 Russian Navy Sevastopol: RCV wkg RHQ33
4950.5 Russian Navy: RIQ88 wkg RAI62, RAI63
5127.0 Russian Navy: RIW wkg RMZW "QYT4 QWH 4282 / 11789"
5171.5 CIS Mil. HPCK QSA check with NZYH and AYDK
5180.0 CIS Mil. 2GPC QSA check
5205.5 CIS Mil. K60C QTJ to W7PV
5409.8 CIS Mil. "QQS NO QQT 057 FM 688 268 FOR 243 687 124 FM 6.. 313 FOR 599 825 K. AR"
5418.0 Russian Mil. T5QB with a message to collective EM4Z: "T5QB 563 22 3 2306 563 = 740 = EDIVV PPPPP BUäZI ... EEIRA PEPäO 576 K. NKLI, JQTP and PO5U QSL on QSX freq 4917 kHz.
5224.0 Russian Navy: RCV. QTC #523 to RBE63, w/NAWIP bulletin
5812.0 CIS Mil. "MOMF(x3) de AIO3(x2) ZNP ZNB RPT ZNP ZNB K"
6374.0 CIS Mil. "VVV...V NW(Ya) 91984 2t28t 94837 k".
6753.0 Russian Military RFF-Net. Msg to RFFR
6825.0 CIS Mil. "JA?L de 9RJ3 QBE QYT4 OK? K" JA?L responds on freq 6875 kHz
6836.0 Russian Navy: RWM56 clg RGR49 for "ZSA?"; clg RGR96 "ZTC 11 31 12 1437 = 430 = OOOOO ..." 5LGs.
6850.0 Ukrainian Navy. UWA211 wkg USU8
6860.0 Russian Navy: RMD99 "... RMD99 TEHNITschESKAYa PROWERKA = 795 = XXX XXX RMD99 RMD99 TEHNITschESKAYa PROWERKA = 795 = 0900 ZLN ar"
6863.0 Ukrainian Navy. URR85 clg USL2
6868.5 CIS Mil. LWQP wkg ZEYU, A5TJ, VYG6, LOKK "QSA4 FOR QRJ 1 K"
  "QSA2 QAA 1 K"
6873.0 Russian Navy Kaliningrad: RMP "... 39171 T6T24 RKB91(x3) RKO81(x3) de RMP(x2) QTC 220 22 7 1443 22t = 11111 10577 ... 39171 T6T24 +"
6877.0 Russian Mil. "XXX XXX RLO RLO PODAROK 01 1310 315 090 1502"
6220.0 Russian Mil. Msg for 8JLU: "2JV8: 454 204 0108 454 = ZQV 354 = ääKRP PPPPP UäZöX ... NUQXN PRPäY 122 K". Then MPAM QTC's ZOCQ with MPAM 584 22 4 0052 584 = 458 = OZKTS PPPPP ... RPT AL QLN K"
6753.0 Russian RFF net: RFFN
7018.0 Russian Air Force: REA4
7028.0 Russian Mil: LCY9, 2BYP
7050.0 Russian Mil: RGT77
7056.0 Russian Mil: E4I4, TSJV
7099.0 Russian Mil: QYWN
7044.0 Russian Air Force: REA4
7066.0 Russian Mil: LLND "qtc 840 2312 250 8406 194 =" + 5FGs
7088.0 CIS Mil: 4FGs
7678.0 Russian Mil. 68x5LG traffic ... GXRAV PWXTP PRPYI 353 K"
  "II9P de 7E5U ZVZ ZWO K. R K"
7922.0 CIS Mil. "XXX XXX XXX SXT4 94556 AGNOSTIK 8774 4463 K"
  YXPL comms check with MCPY, C23F, 8XQB and IZ7D.
8120.0 Russian Mil: RJE56 wkg RJD71
8508.0 Russian Navy: "xxx xxx rks rks rdl rdl 28250 32562 boldyrx 1162 4975 k"
9483.0 RIT: Russian Navy Northern Fleet "rmzw de rit"
10388.0 Russian Navy: RIW wkg RIS96. "vvv ris96 ris96 ris96 de riw riw zzd?" then RIS96 heard with very strong signal "riw de ris96" and giving authentication key ".... odin nolb tudink zkm?" RIW replies and send 25 letter codekey:" ris96 de riw zdd sgngø zzt llkmvlmmvmlmlkkvkmlvlvlkm"
10540.0 Russian Navy: RIW wkg RDND. "rdnd de riw zzd3 k" then giving authentication key "rn i i i i rdnd de riw zný odin nolx wosemx zkm?"
11000.0 Russian Navy: RIW.
  "rie83 de riw" "qsu1 qwh97tt" "rie83 de riw k riw qtc k riw 337 25 5 12t5 337 = 822 = ppp egp wlgzb ÷højc uþ riw rpt"
  RAA clg RMDZ, RJE56 clg RMDZ, RIW QSO RMDZ, asking for phone tfc.
  Navy HQ using strange callsigns: RAA is unid, RJE56 is CIS Navy individual c/s.
  "rdnd de riw qrr3 qdw 1t54t k" (12/dec/2007)(TJ)
  " ... t29 22t = sml fm rit = 11111 t4122 44t5 ... 5t962 13t22 ar riw k"
  "ris96 de riw k" "riw qrr3 qdw 1t388 k"
  "rgr70 de riw qsu1 qwh13086 qsx 12260 k"
  RIW clg RHL80 who responded after ca 15 min.
11468.0 Russian High Command Moscow, unid tx site. "rdl rdl rdl 17744 18718 17744 18718 17744 18718 k" // 18.1, 7657, 8130, 9346, 12741, 14411 kHz.
11155.0 RIT: Russian Navy Northern Fleet: "rmzw de rit qrr3 qsx9483 ok?"
  "rji63 rji63 rji63 de rit rit qrr3 qdw 7549 ok? rit r k"
  "ral48 ral48 ral48 de rit rit qsa + k" later commchecks with RMXV
13086.0 Russian Navy HQ in qso with warship RGR70. USB very weak Russian voice, several "reprim (?)" and several "priyom"
14092.0 Russian Mil: "XXX RGT77 KFDP 67401 densimeter K"
14556.0 Russian Navy: RIW clg RMXV

There was an interesting discussion on UDXF about how to identify Russian or other CIS transmissions. The subject has been discussed before but not as detailed as this time. See below. Comments are most welcome!!!

It started with this note from Tom.

"I was asked last week about "how to differ" RUS from UKR Military of these CW QTCs. Therefore, according to my understanding (correct ?) here is an example the QTC on 3299 kHz received at 2012 UTC (see below):

03299 kHz. DK7S: Russian Military 2012 CW 5LGs QTC to KTC8
"QTC T12 38 22 2251 T12 = 535 = DDDDD ...". 22Dec07 (ALF)

The time in the preamble is always the time at which the message was written, not the time of transmission. In some cases that could be the same, but you will never hear a "future" message... hi

Preamble: QTC T12 38 22 2251 T12 ...

=> Msg written: 2251 Local Time
=> Msg RX: 2012 UTC => 2112 CET => 2212 UKR => 2312 Moscow Time

If the message would be written by UKR MIL at 2251 Ukrainian local time, that message could been received earliest at 2051 UTC. (2251 Moscow time -> earliest possible reception time was 1951 UTC)

Except in the case that the UKR MIL have a time-machine, only the RUS military could be the origin for this (prepared at 2251 local Moscow time) QTC, which was send about 20 minutes later after it was written.

Note: But this ID scheme does not work if the QTC would have been send on the air one hour later, at e.g. 2112 UTC. Than it could mean that

-or-

In this case both UKR and RUS could be the origin.

This means that it is only possible to "exclude" the Ukrainian origin of a message. It is not possible to gave any positive ID for UKR MIL at all, by the time given in the preamble. Correct??

But what about any Belarussian military QTCs (if..) ? or any other CIS military QTCs (if...) ?

Summary:

Looks easy, is'n it? But hope I'm correct... hi

PT - UTC = 0 0 -> 2,0 hours -->>> Russian or Ukrainian
PT - UTC = 2 01 -> 3,0 hours -->>> Russian (Moscow Time Zone)
PT - UTC = 3 01 -> ... -->>> Russian ("more easterly time zones")
PT - UTC = 0 0 -> 3,0 hours -->>> Russian or Ukraine
PT - UTC = 3 01 -> 4,0 hours -->>> Russian (Moscow Time Zone)
PT - UTC = 4 01 -> ... -->>> Russian ("more easterly time zones")

Correct ?

73 MRY XMAS !

Tom - DL8AAM"

 

Fritz replies to Tom:

"Hello Tom

That is exactly, what I meant the other day, when we discussed this subject. It is a very good explanation of the whole story about times in CIS Morse messages. Thank you for touching a story, where much more is behind, than the mere question of times. It is the question, from which timezones we have to expect Russian/CIS comms with the standard Morse PBL.

Saying Ukraine means Belarus and Moldova as well. The same holds for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia or Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan, etc.

Within the CIS there are a number of unions of CIS members, which of course all are dominated by Moscow, like GRVZ (Transcausian Group of Russian Troups), the CISPKF (CIS Peacekeeping Forces), OGRF (Operational Group of Russian Forces), JPKF (Joint Peacekeeping Force in South Ossetia), etc. They all are military organisations, and you never know when and how they will communicate with their HQ.

We are far away from a withdrawing of Russian troops of the FSU (Former States of the Sovjet Union) - the contrary is the case. RUS ground forces today are in Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. RUS AF is in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Ukraine. RUS Ny is in Belarus, Kyrgystan, Ukraine, Syria and Azerbajian. This does not include reconnaissance troups like the 64th Signal Battalion of Georgia in Abkhasia or the 15th Signal Regiment of Moldova in Tiraspol. And they all may be heard somehow, sometimes on Shortwaves.....

This makes it extremely difficult to allocate stations to states or organisations. It may even be possible that the BSF Joint Forces (incl. TUR and ROM) do use the standard CIS PBL for Morse messages during joint exercises.

RDF might bring us some more findings, I hope to make first experiments next spring.

Kind regards

Fritz Nusser
Zuerich Switzerland
"

The Jim steps in with this comment:

"Fritz,

All of that may well be true, but the Russian forces use MSK wherever in the CIS (or the world) they may be based.

The only other CIS nation using standard Russian message formats and procedures is, as far as is known, the Ukraine. So the date-time-group is a perfectly valid method of discriminating between the two. (Given that there have been no inordinate delays between origination and transmission which may lead to confusion.

Best wishes for the festive season.

73 de Jim (MPJ)"


Voice stations | Morse stations | Various modes
Military stations | Utility round-up
Knickebein, X-Gerät, Y-Gerät
N&O 2007 index | Logs
Index | NS NL Home

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